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Tarr: Family Law - Modifying Arbitrator's Awards - A Nod to "Judges of

FAMILY LAW-MODIFYIAIG ARBITRATOR'S AWARDS-A
NOD TO "JUDGES OF THE PARTIES' OWN CHOOSING"Crutchley v. Crutchley, 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981).
INTRODUCTION

Arbitration is a time-tested, relatively inexpensive tool for easing the avalanche of business coming before state and federal
courts." Chief Justice Burger recently suggested that domestic
matters are especially well-suited to voluntary, binding arbitration.2 In addition to reduced court congestion, proponents of arbitration in domestic disputes cite the advantages of informal resolution of highly sensitive matters, minimized polarization of the
parties, speed, economy and finality.' Opponents of arbitration in
domestic disputes point to the lack of judicial safeguards afforded
the parties,5 particularly the limited ability of the court to modify
the arbitrator's award. Contending that domestic matters belong
in the courts, opponents urge that the expediency of arbitration
does not justify abandoning the protections of detailed domestic
statutes which provide readily available modifications. 7 Furthermore, opponents argue that domestic arbitration awards are sufficiently "domestic" in nature to be governed not by arbitration
statutes, but by domestic statutes.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently decided that
the Uniform Arbitration Act s controls the modification of an arbi1. Warren E. Burger, Address to the American Bar Association (Jan. 24,
1982).

2. Id.
3. Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 NoTRE
DAME L. R a. 182, 184 (1965).
4. Comment, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in North Carolina
SeparationAgreements, 15 WA" FOREST L. REv. 487, 490 (1979).
5. Id. at 492.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.14(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.7(a) and 50-16.9(a) (1976).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The Uniform Act does not

expressly exclude domestic disputes from its comprehensive procedure for the arbitration of "any controversy."
(a) Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration
any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement, or
they may include in a written contract a provision for the settlement by
arbitration of any controversy thereafter arising between them relating
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trator's award of spousal support. In Crutchley v. Crutchley,' the
Court held that a judicially confirmed award of spousal support
could not be modified by a motion in the cause.10 The Court's message is clear-if parties choose to arbitrate spousal support, the validity and effect of the agreement" and the arbitrator's award are
measured against the criteria of the Uniform Arbitration Act." On
appeal, the practical question before the North Carolina Supreme
Court is whether parties in a domestic dispute can agree to let
someone other than a judge determine issues traditionally reserved

for the courts, spousal support and child support,1 3 and to what
extent the courts are bound by that agreement and the subsequent
award."
THE CASE

Plaintiff filed an action in 1976, seeking divorce from bed and
board, permanent alimony, alimony pendente lite, child custody
and support and other relief. Defendant denied the material allegations, set up several affirmative defenses as a bar to plaintiffs
action and counterclaimed for divorce from bed and board and
custody of the children. Prior to trial, the parties and their counsel
agreed to arbitration of the entire matter. The court entered an
order confirming the parties' consent to arbitration in October,
to such contract or the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof. Such agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except with the consent of all the parties, without regard to the
justiciable character of the controversy.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
9. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744, discretionary review granted, N.C.
-,S.E.2d (1981).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
11. For a discussion of arbitration clauses in domestic disputes, see 15 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 487 (1979). Prior to Crutchley, North Carolina had not passed
upon the validity and effect in a domestic case of either
1) an agreement to arbitrate or
2) the subsequent arbitrator's award.
12. 53 N.C. App. 732, 747, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1981). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1567.1 et seq. (Cur. Supp. 1981).
13. Appellant briefed and argued the issue of arbitration of child support,
but the Court of Appeals ruled that only the issue of spousal support had been
properly preserved on appeal. 53 N.C. App. 732, 737, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1981).
14. The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard oral argument April 6, 1982,
just prior to submission of this Note for publication.
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1976.1 ' In December, 1977, the court granted defendant's motion
for confirmation"' of the award.1 7 Two years later, plaintiff filed a
15. Record at 13, 14, Crutchely v. Crutchley, 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d
744 (1981).
CONSENT ORDER

His HONOR, GRArON C. BEAMAN, DisTRICT JUDGE
PRESIDING:
This cause coming on to be heard and being heard, and the following disposition being made by consent
(1) Dr. B. C. West, Jr. is hereby appointed arbitrator in this cause, and
he shall be guided by the following procedure:
(a) He shall review the pleadings appearing in this cause in order
to familiarize himself with the contentions of the parties.
(b) The arbitrator's report in this case shall be final and binding on
all parties.
(c) The arbitrator shall file his report in the office of the Clerk of
Superior Court of Pasquotank County within a reasonable time after he has had opportunity to make review and study of the
matter.
(d) The arbitrator shall have full power and authority to require
each of the parties to appear before him as he may deem advisable,
to offer to him such evidence as he deems necessary, including documents, reports, checks, bookkeeping entries, income tax returns,
and any and all other evidence that the parties desire to present to
said arbitrator, it being the intent and purpose hereof that the said
arbitrator shall have the opportunity to receive and consider, and
the parties shall have the opportunity to present to the arbitrator,
full and complete evidence pertaining to the case. The arbitrator
shall interview any witnesses which the parties may bring before
him and consider all other relevant evidence, and he shall have full
subpoena power.
(e) The arbitrator is authorized and empowered to interview the
parties and their witnesses, and review their documentary and oral
evidence in conference, in an informal manner, open and formal
hearing not being necessary.
(2) It is the intent and purpose hereof that the said arbitrator is fully
authorized and empowered to bring this controversy to a conclusion and,
as aforesaid, his report shall constitute the final and binding decision
with respect to this case.
(3) After filing his report, the arbitrator shall suggest to the Court the
amount of his compensation and a determination with respect to the
same shall be made by the Court.
WHEREUPON, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DzCIWD
that the foregoing consent of the parties with respect to arbitration
is approved and so ordered.
This 18th day of October, 1976.
(The order was also signed by the parties and their attorneys.)
16. Id. at 19, 20.
PRESENT,
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motion in the cause requesting:
1) modification of the order confirming the arbitration award,
and
2) modification of the award to increase the amounts of ali-

mony and child support and to strike the cohabitation
restriction.
Plaintiff did not attack the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.1 s Defendant argued that the arbitration award was final and
binding. The court denied plaintiff's motion, ruling that the remedy of motion in the cause was unavailable to plaintiff.1 '
On appeal, plaintiff assigned as error'0 that the arbitrator's
award and the order confirming the award failed to comply with

the procedure in actions for alimony and alimony pendente lite'
The undersigned District Court Judge, upon receiving a motion for a
confirmation of the award of arbitrator in this case, and having first reviewed the record and making a finding that an arbitrator's award has
been made; that the award is made under proper authority and that the
same is fair and in the best interest of the children and the parties, and
further finding that each party by consent order dated October 18, 1976,
agreed that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding and it appearing that the arbitrator's award is now subject to confirmation;
It is hereby ORDERED that the award of arbitrator is hereby CONFIRMED, and that this case therefore be removed from the docket as having been settled by arbitration.
This 1st day of December, 1977.
s/GRArrON C. BEAMAN
District Court Judge
17. Id. at 15-19. The arbitrator's award granted plaintiff custody of the two
oldest children; child support of $200.00 per month per child; payment of 75% of
their medical, dental and college expenses by defendant; and visitation rights with
the youngest child, of whom defendant was given custody. The support awards
were made subject to a yearly cost of living increase. Plaintiff was also awarded
$500.000 per month as alimony and possession of the residence until her death,
remarriage or cohabitation. It made other property dispositions.
The award did not contain a recitation of facts or reasons for the decision.
18. Id. at 20-23.
19. Id. at 25-26.
20. Id.
That the court below committed error in dismissing the plaintiff's motions in the cause for the reason that the arbitrator's award entered on
December 1, 1977, and the subsequent order of the court confirming said
award dated December 1, 1977, on its face failed to comply with the procedure in actions for alimony and alimony pendente lite as provided by
G.S. § 50-16.8(f) and for modification as provided by G.S. § 50-16.9(a).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8(f) (1976).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/10
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because all of "said orders" were subject to modification. 22 Plaintiff
also argued in her briefPs that child support may be modified by a
motion in the cause, 4 and alternatively, that arbitration of domestic disputes was against public policy in North Carolina. Defendant
maintained that spousal support is arbitrable under the broad language of the Uniform Arbitration Act, and that the Uniform Arbitration Act provides the exclusive procedure for modifying an arbitrator's award.25 Limiting its decision to the issue of spousal
support,' the Court held that the arbitration of spousal support is
not contrary to public policy in North Carolina and that the Uniform Act provides the only procedure for modifying a judicially
confirmed arbitrator's award. Since the appellant had allowed the
statutory time period for modification to pass, the spousal support
could not be modified without the consent of the parties. 7
BACKGROUND

The Court held that an agreement to arbitrate and a judicially
confirmed arbitrator's award for spousal support are given the
same effect as a separation agreement."8 A history of arbitration in
North Carolina helps explain this holding. At common law, parties
selected an arbitrator by mutual consent to determine controverted matters of law and fact."' Arbitrators were a "law unto
themselves," deciding not according to law, but according to their
own notions of justice.8 0 Arbitrators were not, and are not, bound
by the rules of evidence or procedure,3 1 nor required to assign rea22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
23. Brief for Appellant at 11-13, Crutchley v. Crutchley, 53 N.C. App. 732,
281 S.E.2d 744 (1981). Rule 10(a), Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that an
assignment of error is not required if the brief raises the question whether "the
judgment is supported by the .

.

. findings of fact and conclusions of law ..

See infra note 101.
24. Id. at 4, 5.
25. Brief for Appellee at 4, 7, Crutchley v. Crutchley, 53 N.C. App. 732, 281
S.E.2d 744 (1981).
26. 53 N.C. App. 732, 737, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1981).
27. Id. at 738, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
28. Id. at 740, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
29. Crisp v. Love, 65 N.C. 126 (1871).
30. Poe and Sons v. University of North Carolina, 248 N.C. 617, 624, 104 S.E.
2d 189, 195 (1958), citing Patton v. Garrett, 116 N.C. 848, 21 S.E. 679 (1895).
31. Calvine Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 238 N.C. 719, 79 S.E.2d
181 (1953).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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sons for their actions." Even today, though the record discloses no
evidence upon which the arbitrator bases his decision, the court
will assume there was evidence for the action.3 3 Mistakes of law or
fact are the parties' misfortune, for "the court has no power to revise the decisions of 'judges who are of the parties' own choosing.' "" If mistakes were a sufficient ground for setting aside
awards, arbitration would tend to increase litigation, thereby undercutting its purpose."8
North Carolina's strong policy of freedom to contract36 complements arbitration's goal of allowing parties to settle disputes
among themselves without resort to the expense and delay of litigation.37 To encourage the private settlement of property rights,
North Carolina recognizes an agreement to arbitrate as a contract."8 Consideration is found in the mutual promises" and the
remedy for breach4 of an agreement to arbitrate is an action for
breach of contract. 0
The Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted in North Carolina"'
is an enlargement of the common law rules." At common law, only

existing controversies could be arbitrated,4 ' but the current statute
allows arbitration of existing or future disputes, without regard to
the justiciability of the controversy." The three statutory grounds
32. Poe and Sons v. University of North Carolina, 248 N.C. 617, 104 S.E.2d
189 (1958).
33. Bryson v. Higdon, 222 N.C. 17, 21 S.E.2d 836 (1942).
34. Carolina Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 41 N.C. App. 407,
415, 255 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1979).
35. Id.
36. North Carolina Assoc. of Licensed Detectives v. Morgan, Attorney General, 17 N.C. App. 701, 195 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Spencer v. Spencer, 37 N.C. App.
481, 488, 246 S.E.2d 805, 810, appeal dismissed, 296 N.C. 106 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 958 (1979).
37. Poe and Sons v. University of North Carolina, 248 N.C. 617, 625, 104
S.E.2d 189, 195 (1958).
38. Tobacco Workers Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 957 (4th Cir.
1971); City Coach Lines v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 254 N.C. 60, 67, 118
S.E.2d 37, 43 (1961); Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 387, 67 S.E.2d 267,
269 (1951), citing Sprinkle v. Sprinkle, 159 N.C. 81, 83, 74 S.E. 739, 739-40 (1912).
39. Mayo v. Gardner, 49 N.C. 359 (1857).
40. McDonough Constr. Co. v. Hanner, 232 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1981).
42. Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 233 N.C. 46, 62
S.E.2d 535 (1950), construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-544 (repealed 1973).
43. Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951).
44. The text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) appears supra at note 8.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/10
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for modification of the arbitrator's award are:
1) the arbitrator made an evident miscalculation of figures or an

evident mistake in the description of any person or property referred to in the award;

2) the arbitrator awarded on a matter not submitted to him;
3) the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the
merits of the controversy."
Absent these grounds, the court is not permitted to modify or correct an arbitrator's award."" An appeal from an order confirming
an award may be taken in the same manner as from orders or judgments in other civil actions.4 7
The broad language of the Uniform Arbitration Act impliedly
invites parties to arbitrate domestic matters, but few courts have
considered whether arbitration of domestic matters is against public policy."8 In North Carolina, a dependent spouse's right to support is a property right." Spousal support may be made the subject of a contrac 5 within a separation agreement. 61 A New York
court has stated that if spouses may contract for spousal support
in a separation agreement, no objection should be raised as to the
right of the parties to agree upon another tribunal to do the same
thing. 2 Therefore, a judicially confirmed 8 arbitrator's award of
spousal support may be likened to a separation agreement" or, by
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.14 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

46. Carolina Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunther, 41 N.C. App. 407,
415, 255 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1979).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.18 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
48. Wertlake v. Wertlake, 137 N.J. Super. 476, 349 A.2d 552 (1975) (Trial
judge expressed the view that arbitration was ill-adapted to matters concerning
the children, but appellate court expressly left "for another day the important
issue of the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a property settlement
agreement between husband and wife incident to a suit for divorce.").
For a discussion of New York's view of arbitration clauses in domestic disputes,
see generally 15 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 487 (1979). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d
1264 (1968).
49. Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 128, 128 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962).
50. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639, 133 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963); Holden v.
Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 6, 95 S.E.2d 118, 123 (1956), citing Brown v. Brown, 205 N.C.
64, 70, 169 S.E. 818, 821 (1933).
51. R. LEE, 2 NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW, § 145 (4th ed. 1980).
52. Robinson v. Robinson, 186 Misc. 974, 61 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
rev'd, 271 A.D. 98 (1946), rev'd, 296 N.Y. 778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.12 (Supp. 1981) requires that all arbitration
awards be confirmed by the court.
54. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 53 N.C. App. 732, 740, 281 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1981).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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extension, to a consent judgment.""
The procedure for modifying an arbitrator's award for spousal
support, like the procedure for modifying consent judgments and
separation agreements, may depend upon whether the consent order confirming the award is interpreted as merely the court's sanction of the parties' contract, or the court's adoption of the award as
its own determination of the rights and obligations of the parties.
Consent judgments for the payment of spousal support are of two
kinds. 6 ' When the court merely approves the amounts the husband
has agreed to pay to the wife, the judgment results in an ordinary
contract.6 7 The agreement is enforceable only as an ordinary contract and cannot be changed or set aside without the consent of
the parties. 5 Because the court does not order the payments, the
spousal support is technically not alimony."9 When the court
adopts the agreement as its own determination of the rights and
obligations of the parties, its order supersedes the agreement of the
parties.10 The spousal support is transformed into alimony.61 Alimony may be modified or vacated at any time by a motion in the
cause and a showing of changed circumstances." The statute
grants no similar provision for modifying spousal support. "The
judgment must be an order, and the order must be for alimony."'
Therefore, a consent judgment which merely approves the agreement of the parties does not award alimony within the accepted
definition of the term" and is not subject to modification. The lan55. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 672, 252 S.E.2d 698, 704 (1979).
56. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964). This distinction has been adopted in a number of cases: Holsomback v. Holsomback, 273 N.C.
728, 161 S.E.2d 99 (1968); Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218
(1966); Seaborn v. Seaborn, 32 N.C. App. 556, 233 S.E.2d 67 (1977). It is now also
embodied in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
57. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964); Moore v.
Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 16, 252 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1979); Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1,
8, 95 S.E.2d 118, 122 (1956); Bailey v. Bailey, 26 N.C. App. 444, 446, 216 S.E.2d
394, 396 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Id.; White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 666, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979).
60. Rowe v. Rowe, 52 N.C. App. 646, 660, 280 S.E.2d 182, 190 (1981). "The
alimony provision of a court-adopted consent judgment is modifiable and enforceable by the court's contempt power because the court's order supersedes the parties agreement."
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
62. Id.
63. Jones v. Jones, 42 N.C. App. 467, 470, 256 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1979).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(1) (1976) states: "Alimony means payment for

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/10
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guage of a consent judgment" is construed to ascertain the intent
of the parties." Imprecise drafting of the order confirming the arbitrator's award may lead to an unintentional preservation or obliteration of a party's future rights in the cause. 6
ANALYSIS

In Crutchley v. Crutchley,68 a unanimous Court

held that

spousal support is arbitrable. 70 The Court noted that spousal support is not listed as one of the two statutory exceptions to the general rule of subsection (a) providing for the arbitration of "any
controversy. '71 Since spousal support is not expressly excluded, the

Court felt compelled to conclude that the legislature's intent 7 ' was
for "any controversy," including a spousal support controversy, to
be arbitrable. 73 After deciding that spousal support is a proper
subject for arbitration, the Court said the Uniform Arbitration
the support and maintenance of a spouse, either in lump sum or on a continuing
basis, ordered in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board,
or an action for alimony with divorce." (Emphasis added).
65. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 664, 252 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1979) (consent
judgment in which court "adopt[ed] the agreement of the parties as its own determination of their respective rights and obligations" and held it to be an order of
the court for alimony and modifiable by a motion in the cause); Levitch v.
Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 439, 241 S.E.2d 506, 507 (1978) (". . . in the usual case in
which we have found approval rather than adoption, the court has stated merely
that the agreement was approved, reviewed the subject matter of the agreement
in a narrative form without further order, or expressly excluded the agreement
from any prejudice under the terms of the judgment."); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C.
635, 636, 133 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1963) (consent judgment in which lower court accepted the liability of the husband concerning support of the wife "as though
determined by a court without the consent of either party" held to be an order of
the court for alimony and modifiable by a motion in the cause); Britt v. Britt, 49
N.C. App. 463, 464, 271 S.E.2d 921, 923 (1980) (consent judgment in which court
"retained jurisdiction of the cause" was subject to modification by the trial court).
66. Bland v. Bland, 21 N.C. App. 192, 195, 203 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1974).
67. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 258, 154 S.E.2d 71, 75 (1967).
68. 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981).
69. Judge Martin wrote the opinion. Id. at 736, 281 S.E.2d at 745. Judges
Clark and Hill concurred. Id. at 740, 281 S.E.2d at 749.
70. 53 N.C. App. 732, 737, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747.
71. Id.
72. Id. The ommission of domestic disputes from the statutory exceptions
implies that the legislature did not intend to except domestic disputes from
arbitration.
73. Id.
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Act 74 supplied the sole method" of modifying and appealing an

award. Since appellant did not seek either modification or appeal
of the award until two years after the delivery of the award, she
had waived her right to modify or appeal the award.'
The Court rejected appellant's contention that either the consent judgment ordering arbitration or the order confirming the
award must comply with North Carolina General Statute § 5016.8(0. (North Carolina General Statutes hereafter referred to as
G.S.) Subsection (f)
requires the judge to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but is inapplicable to a situation where the parties agree under the Uniform Arbitration Act to arbitrate spousal
support." The Uniform Arbitration Act contemplates the informal
private settlement of disputes rather than the judicial proceeding
envisioned in subsection (f). The purpose of the Act would be
emasculated if the arbitrator were required to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Subsection (f)
modification would also
undercut the plain intent of the parties to make a final, binding
settlement of their rights and obligations. The order approving the
agreement to arbitrate stated: "(i)t is the intent and purpose
hereof that the said arbitrator is fully authorized and empowered
to bring this controversy to a conclusion and... his report shall
constitute the final and binding decision with respect to this
case." 7 The order stated in subsection (b), "The arbitrator's report

in this case shall be final and binding on all parties."'7 And finally,
the order concluded, "It is hereby ORDERED that the award of
the arbitrator is hereby CONFIRMED, and that this case therefore
be removed from the docket as having been settled by
arbitration.' 0
The Court analogized an agreement to arbitrate the issue of
spousal support to a separation agreement, which cannot be set
aside or changed without the consent of the parties.' A spouse's
right to support is a property right which may be released by con74. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 1-567.14 and 1-567.18 (1973) (Cune. Supp. 1981).

75. 53 N.C. App. 732, 738, 281 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1981).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 739, 281 S.E.2d at 748.
78. Id. at 733, 281 S.E.2d at 745.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 735, 281 S.E.2d at 746.
81. Id. at 740, 281 S.E.2d at 748. The analogy is not perfect. A separation
agreement does not require the court's front-end approval, while an agreement to
arbitrate requires the judge to delegate his authority to the arbitrator in advance.
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tract, and a separation agreement is a contract.6 2 North Carolina
policy, reflected in other legislative enactments, supports the
Court's conclusion that spousal support should be arbitrable.
North Carolina's "no-fault" divorce provision s8 was enacted to enable a husband and wife to terminate their marriage without the
sensationalism and public airing of dirty linen which necessarily
accompany a divorce based on fault.84 Arbitration seeks also to
avoid the sensationalism that often accompanies domestic disputes. The repeal of the privy exam statute"' reflects both the legislature's high regard for the freedom of contract and a trend away
from protecting married women. North Carolina's statute allowing
a separation agreement to bar a subsequent action for alimony,"
indicates the legislature's preference for freedom of contract even
in a domestic dispute context. Similarly, arbitration enhances the
freedom to contract by recognizing husband and wife as bargaining
equals.
The Court's assumption that the legislature intended domestic
matters to be subject to the Uniform Arbitration Act merely because domestic matters were not expressly excluded from the
Act,8 7 however, may be too broad. Child support and custody are
not expressly excluded from the Uniform Arbitration Act either,
but North Carolina courts have not allowed parties to contract in
separation agreements to withdraw children from the protective
custody of the court." Rather, failure to exclude domestic matters
from the Act may indicate the legislature did not contemplate the
s Continued legislative siAct would be used for domestic matters.8
lence, following the holding in Crutchley v. Crutchley, will be more
significant.
Appellant argued that the language in the confirmation order
that the award "is fair and in the best interests of the children and
82. R.

LEE,

2

NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW,

§ 201 (3d ed. 1963).

83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(b) (1976).
84. Harrington v. Harrington, 22 N.C. App. 419, 206 S.E.2d 742, rev'd on
other grounds, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1973) (repealed 1978).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1965).
87. 53 N.C. App. 732, 737, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1981).
88. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964); Fuchs v.
Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639, 133 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963); see also Holden v. Holden,
245 N.C. 1, 6, 95 S.E.2d 118, 122 (1956).
89. The legislative history of the Uniform Arbitration Act is silent concerning
the Act's applicability to domestic matters.
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the parties"90 demonstrated the trial judge had adopted the agreement as his own determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties. Thus, appellant argued, the spousal support would become
technical alimony,"1 modifiable by a motion in the cause under
G.S. § 50-16.9(a). 92 The Court answered by citing Ellis v. Ellis"3 for
the broad proposition that consent judgments, being the judgments of the parties, cannot be set aside without the consent of the
parties."' The Court did not discuss the well-recognized " distinction between a consent judgment which merely approves the agreement of the parties and a consent judgment in which the court
adopts the agreement as its own determination." If a judicially
confirmed arbitration award is equivalent to a judicially confirmed
separation agreement, the nature of the consent judgment should
be equally determinative in both situations. The bench's practice
of giving a dual meaning to "consent judgments" leads to confusing results. For example, an order for alimony whether "contested
or entered by consent," is made modifiable by the statute." Nevertheless, if a court finds that the order was merely the "approval" of
the court, the court does not allow modification. One should compare this non-modifiable situation with the courts' treatment of
G.S. § 50-13.7(a). Under this statute, consent orders are not specifically made modifiable, but the order for child support remains
subject to modification. Treating all consent orders as approvals,
as the Court did in Crutchley v. Crutchley, is less confusing-but a
great deal of judge-made law must be reconciled to that treatment.
Therefore, until the courts abandon the "approval/adoption" distinction, a workable solution would be to allow modification of consent orders that "adopt" an arbitrator's award for spousal support.
If the order merely "approves" the arbitrator's award for spousal
support the award would not be modifiable. The effect of a consent
order with respect to an arbitration award and a separation agreement would then be consistent.
90. 53 N.C. App. 732, 735, 281 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1981).
91. See supra note 64.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
93. 193 N.C. 216, 136 S.E.2d 350 (1926).
94. 53 N.C. App. 732, 739, 281 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1981).
95. Holsomback v. Holsomback, 273 N.C. 728, 161 S.E.2d 99 (1968); Sayland
v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 818 (1966); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136
S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964).
96. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
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The Court did not answer appellant's contention that child
support is not a proper subject for arbitration. The Court carefully
limited its decision to the issue of spousal support, appellant's sole
assignment of error:98 "Thus, the only question before this Court
on this appeal concerns the validity and effect of the portion of the
arbitrator's award concerning support of the plaintiff-appellant.""
Appellant argued 0 0 that the question of child support was properly raised in her brief, thus qualifying for review under the proviso to Rule 10(a), Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 0' In State v.
Samuels,10 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court said of the proviso,
"(i)t is clear that a defendant may properly present on appeal the
questions enumerated in Rule 10(a), without taking any exceptions
or making any assignments of error in the record . . . ."
Narrowing the decision to the arbitration of spousal support enabled
the Court to avoid the more difficult problem of fusing North Carolina's policy of parens patriae with the benefits of arbitration. An
agreement by the parents with respect to child support and custody does not permanently bind the court.'0 But arbitration of domestic disputes is attractive largely because it may supply an antidote to clogged court calendars. Court congestion will not be
reduced, however, unless the arbitrator's award is final and binding
on the parties. Furthermore, the Court found spousal support to be
a proper subject for arbitration because it read the Uniform Arbi98. The entire assignment of error is set out supra in note 20.
99. 53 N.C. App. 732, 737, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1981). (Emphasis in original).
100. Brief for Appellant, Petition for Rehearing, at 4, 5, Crutchley v. Crutchley, 53 N.C. App. 732, 281 S.E.2d 744 (1981). The Court of Appeals denied appellant's petition for re-hearing.
101. No exception not so set out may be made the basis of an assignment
of error; and no exception so set out which is not made the basis of an
assignment of error may be considered on appeal. Provided, that upon
appeal duly taken from a final judgment any party to the appeal may
present for review, by properly raising them in*his brief, the questions
whether the judgment is supported by the verdict or by the findings of
fact and conclusions of law, whether the court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter, and whether a criminal charge is sufficient in law, notwithstanding the absence of exceptions or assignments of error in the
record on appeal.
Rule 10(a), Rules of Appellate Procedure (Cum. Supp. 1981). In Peoples Service
Drug Stores, Inc., v. Mayfair, 50 N.C. App. 442, 274 S.E.2d 365 (1981), the Court
invoked Rule 2 to suspend Rule 10 altogether.
102. 298 N.C. 783, 260 S.E.2d 427 (1979).
103. Id. at 786, 260 S.E.2d at 430.
104. See cases cited infra note 107.
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tration Act as allowing arbitration in all matters not specifically
excluded, yet North Carolina courts have not surrendered continuing jurisdiction over matters involving the welfare of the minor
children. 10 6 The tangle created by superimposing the slightly overbroad arbitration statute onto well-settled case law concerning the
modification of child support should be resolved permanently by
the Legislature. Until the Legislature clarifies the desirability, validity and effect of arbitrating child support, the Supreme Court
has available a middle position that is consistent with earlier case
law and the benefits offered by the present arbitration statute.
The Court of Appeals' sound reasoning with respect to the arbitration of spousal support should be extended to the arbitration
of child support. In Crutchley v. Crutchley, the Court gave a judicially confirmed arbitrator's award for spousal support the same
validity and effect as a separation agreement.'" While a separation
agreement may be final on the issue of spousal support, it is not
necessarily binding on matters of child welfare. Regardless of
whether a separation agreement is "approved" or "adopted" by the
court, "neither agreements nor adjudications for the custody or
support of a minor child are ever final. Parties may never withdraw
children from the protective supervision of the court."1 Because
an arbitrator's award must be confirmed by the court to comply
with G.S. § 1-567.12, the court would always establish jurisdiction
over any child support agreement contained in the award just as it
does in a separation agreement. G.S. § 50-13.7(a) provides that
"(a)n order of a court of this State for support of a minor child
may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause
and a showing of changed circumstances . . . ." Therefore, the
child support provision of a judicially confirmed arbitrator's award
would be modifiable by a motion in the cause. As in separation
agreements, child support provisions should be presumed to be
"just and reasonable,"' " but they would not withdraw the children
from the protective custody of the court. ' " Analogizing child support and custody provisions in an arbitrator's award with child
support and custody provisions in a judicially confirmed separation
105. Id.
106. 53 N.C. App. 732, 740, 281 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1981).

107. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964). See also
Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 139 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C.

1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956).
108. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639, 133 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963).

109. Id.
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agreement accommodates arbitration without offending the deeply
held parens patriae policy of North Carolina.'1 If judicially confirmed arbitrator's awards were this closely aligned with separation
agreements and consent judgments, one may inquire what advantage would remain for arbitration of domestic disputes. In the
often strained atmosphere of marital dissolution, parties are likely
to disagree on nearly everything, thus making the separation agreement process expensive and time consuming. By using arbitration,
the parties need only to agree upon an acceptable arbitrator. The
parties can thereby avoid the expense, frustration and bitterness
that will often accompany prolonged negotiations.
The Court's decision to bind the parties to the agreement to
arbitrate and the arbitration award is the more fair decision. Appellee contracted to support the children after their eighteenth
birthdays and to increase automatically his monthly payments to
reflect changes in the cost of living."' Allowing appellant to modify
those portions of the award with which she was dissatisfied, while
locking appellee into the portions of the award appellant prefered,
would be inequitable. Moreover, the parties have since obtained an
absolute divorce and the divorce decree made no reference to either spousal support, child support, or the arbitrator's award. An
action for spousal support cannot be maintained after a decree of
absolute divorce."' If the Court were now to invalidate the arbitrator's award, conceivably appellant would be left without any
spousal support whatsoever.
If the Supreme Court of North Carolina wishes to postpone
entirely its consideration of the use of arbitration in domestic disputes, technical grounds exist to provide a way. The Uniform Arbitration Act requires that "upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment or decree shall be
entered in conformity therewith and be docketed and enforced as
any other judgment or decree . .
1, The record does not show
that judgment was ever entered and docketed. While this indicates
the trial judge indeed meant to remove the case from the docket as
having been settled by arbitration, 1 4 nevertheless the Uniform Arbitration Act technically was not complied with. The Court of Ap110.
111.
award is
112.
113.
114.

R. LEE, 2 NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW, § 152 (4th ed. 1980).
53 N.C. App. 732, 735, 281 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1981). This portion of the
set out supra note 17.
McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.15 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
See supra note 16.
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peals did not address this issue.
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals opened the door to arbitration of domestic disputes in Crutchley v. Crutchley, holding that the Uniform Arbitration Act governs the procedure for initiation, modification and appeal of arbitrator's awards to the exclusion of the
domestic statutes. By reaching this conclusion, the Court validates
both agreements to arbitrate domestic matters and judically confirmed arbitrator's awards. Because arbitration is potentially less
expensive than litigation and affords the parties more privacy, arbitration would almost certainly be used frequently. Special care in
drafting the confirmation order is necessary to minimize the possibility that spousal support will be transformed into alimony, subjecting the award to later modification through a motion in the
cause.
Although the Court did not address the issue of arbitration
and child support, a suitable solution must accommodate the advantages of arbitration without offending North Carolina's policy
of parens patriae.This can be accomplished by granting child support provisions in a judicially confirmed arbitrator's award a presumption of reasonableness, while not foreclosing later modification by the court; the same method the North Carolina courts
presently employ with respect to separation agreements.
From a practical point of view, the Supreme Court will be deciding whether the advantages of reduced court congestion, privacy
and economy outweigh the disadvantage of at least partially foreclosing the trial judge from modifying an award granted not by the
court, but by "judges of the parties' own choosing."
Gene B. Tarr
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